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The Impact of Infrastructure on 
Pakistan's Agricultural Sector 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
Agriculture is the largest of the sectors contributing to economic activity in 
Pakistan; it provides over 25 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), employs over 50 percent of the labor force, and sustains 75 percent of the 
population. The sector directly accounts for over 25 percent of total exports, with 
cotton textiles and other agro-based manufactured exports accounting for an 
additional 35 to 40 percent of total exports. In FY 1989/90 the sector accounted 
for over 15.3 percent of the public sector development plan (including the 
fertilizer subsidy), 18.5 percent of private fixed investment, and 11 percent of 
total fixed investment. 1 
Because of its importance, Pakistan's agricultural sector has been examined at 
length.2 While not denying the significance of factors such as pricing policies, 
subsidized inputs, the Green Revolution, farm size distribution and yields, land 
reform efforts, and the impact of research and extension on crop yields, the 
purpose of this paper is to examine a relatively neglected area likely to be critical 
to the sector's long-run viability-infrastructural development.3 In particular, it 
seeks to determine what role infrastructure has played in the sector's growth. Has 
infrastructure initiated growth, or passively responded in order to alleviate 
bottlenecks created by growth? Have deficiencies in infrastructure been a major 
constraint on the sector's expansion? If so, what areas of infrastructure appear 
most productive for expanding future agricultural output? 
Trends in Agricultural Output 
Pakistan's agricultural sector has altematoo periods of vigorous output growth 
with years of stagnation or productivity decline. In the 1950s low output growth 
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was due to the disruptive effects of partition from India, water shortages resulting 
from a water dispute with India, and bad weather (drought in 1950/51 and 1951/52, 
and floods in 1954/55 and 1955/56).4 The Green Revolution spurred recovery in 
the early 1960s. Growth became more intense in the late 1960s, and agricultural 
output grew at an average annual rate of 5.6 percent for a decade. 
In the early 1970s agricultural growth slowed owing to unfavorable weather 
(floods in 1972/73 and 1973174, and drought in 1974/75),5 and because the Green 
Revolution's gains (new varieties of wheat, grown with controlled water, fertilizers, 
and pesticides) leveled off. The resumption of rapid growth in agriculture 
coincided with the launching of Pakistan's Fifth Five Year Plan (FY 1979/83) in 
FY 1978/79. Average annual growth in agricultural value added was greater than 
4 percent during the plan period, nearly twice the 2.3 percent per annum rate of 
the. preceding five years. 
The Sixth Plan (FY 1984/88) focused on attaining greater self-sufficiency in 
agriculture. The major components of this strategy were diversification of crops, 
strengthening the institutional framework, structural adjustments in the pattern of 
production and distribution, adoption ofbetter agronomic practices, modernization 
of agriculture, and increasing productivity (especially of small farmers) in order 
to create exportable surpluses.6 
The average annual growth rate of the agricultural sector during the Sixth Plan 
period was 3.8 percent as against a target of 4.9 percent. Cotton production 
increased substantially owing to the use of high-yielding varieties of seed, higher 
fertilizer application rates, and improved plant protection measures. The production 
of sugarcane, rice, and wheat, however, were below the targets set in the plan. 
The decline in sugarcane production may be attributed inter alia to the failure 
ofresearch institutes to develop high-yielding varieties for general cultivation at 
attractive support prices for sugarcane from 1981 to 1986, and the lack of 
cooperation between sugar mills and cane producers. In the case of rice, a 
shortage of water at the transplanting stage, low rainfall, pest attacks, the lack of 
a high-yielding variety of rice, and monopoly procurement of rice at low prices 
resulted in decreased production. Finally, wheat production was affected by 
adverse weather in 1986/87 and 1987 /88. The overall performance ofthe livestock 
subsector was close to 6 percent per year as envisaged in the plan.7 
Over the past decade, the agriculture sector has undergone major technological 
and policy transformations. By introducing technical changes offering production 
incentives, and increasing the availability offertilizer, water, and credit, Pakistan 
has increased its exportable surplus of cotton and is close to self-sufficiency in 
wheat. For the 1980-88 period the corresponding figure was 4.3 percent, up from 
3.3 over the 1965-80 period (table 1). Since then overall growth has been 
maintained at similar levels (table 2). As in most semiarid developing countries, 
however, considerable variations exist in allJlual and seasonal production owing 
to adverse weather, pest incidence, and uncertain irrigation supply. 8 
Pakistan's agriculture is also characterized by regional disparities: Sindh and 
Punjab are the granary of Pakistan, whereas North West Frontier Province 
(NWFP) and Balochistan are the food-deficit regions. Average wheat yields in 
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Balochistan and NWFP are about 25 percent lower than in Sindh and Punjab. Low 
fertilizer applications, traditional fanning practices, limited extension services, 
mountainous terrain, and a smaller share of irrigated land explain the slower pace 
of agricultural development in these two provinces. 9 
TABLE l 
GROWTH OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
(Average Annual Percentage Increase in Value Added) 
Country 1965-80 1980-88 
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TABLE2 
PAKISTAN: GROWTH OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
(Average Annual Percentage Change in Value Added) 
1988/89 1989/90 1983/90 
13.8 ---0.9 3.0 
- 1.3 0.8 - 0.7 
- 5.9 3.0 12.6 
12.0 -2.l 1.5 
- 3.2 2.0 10.6" 
6.9 2.7 4.0 
1989/90 







SOURCE: Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey 1989190 (Islamabad: Finance Division, Economic 
Adviser's Wing, 1990). 
"The major oil seed is cotton, which is reflected in value added ofunginned cotton. Rape and mustard seed 
constitute another l percent of value added. 
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Sources of Agricultural Growth 
The early phase of agricultural growth in Pakistan was characterized as one of 
expanding the land under cultivation, that is, expanding the extensive margin. 
From 1950 to 1970, the total cultivated area expanded 26 percent while the 
cropped area increased by 30 percent. 10 Large-scale water projects and tubewell 
irrigation brought more land into production and made the Green Revolution 
possible in the 1960s. Area expansion accounted for the entire increase in 
sugarcane output in the 1950s and for 30 to 50 percent of all major crops' output 
during the 1960s, when the Green Revolution began to dramatically increase 
yields. 
The limits of the extensive margin were reached by the early 1970s since the 
best arable lands in Pakistan had already been brought into cultivation. Although 
the irrigated area continues to increase, further additions to tillable land would 
have to come from decreasing the "cultivable waste" (areas around waterworks 
and areas on each river bank usually uncultivated as a precaution against flood 
damage), and the land "not available for cultivation" (arid zones, brush land, and hilly 
terrain). Neither offers much scope for area expansion; hence future increases in 
agricultural output will have to come from the intensive margin-increasing 
yields and/or labor productivity. 
Constraints to Agricultural Output 
Given the difficulties of increasing the cultivated area, the extent to which 
raising yields and labor productivity can contribute to future output growth will 
be critical determinants of the country's food situation. The potential for 
productivity increases is limited by several major constraints-inadequate input 
management and institutional support, labor-supply bottlenecks, environmental 
degradation, and the supply of water. Of these, the supply of water is probably the 
most severe. 
Water is a binding constraint to land extension for agriculture. The limited 
expansion in area cultivated despite continued increases in water availability is 
an indication that additions to irrigation water at the extensive margin have come 
increasingly at greater cost. 
The greatest scope for further important increments in irrigation water supply 
is likely to lie at the intensive margin of agriculture and will come through better 
operating policies for the irrigation system, an increasing water conveyance 
efficiency, and better on-farm management. Currently conveyance losses from 
river to distributary canal amounts to an estimated 25 percent, and from the 
distributary canal outlet to farmers' field to another 40 percent. 11 Studies modeling 
the Indus Basin have demonstrated that better operating policies for the irrigation 
system can bring about major improvements in operating efficiencies, and hence 
reduce crop losses. 12 
In addition to the problem of water availability, deficient use and management 
of inputs is an important constraint to agricultural growth. Pakistani agriculture 
still ranks low in input use relative to other developing countries despite progress 
over the last several decades. Greater use of inputs may increase yields if they are 
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managed properly. Although fertilizer use grew rapidly from 1970 to 1980 (14 
percent per annum and close to 9 percent since 1980), crop yields did not. Limited 
water availability and inappropriate nutrient balance are often cited as reasons for 
this lack of yield response. 13 
Considerable effort has been made to incorporate the various supply constraints 
just noted into a comprehensive forecast of future food supplies (and demand 
balance). Of these, the most comprehensive is the Revised Indus Basin Model 
(RIBM). 14 According to RIBM demand and output projections made in May 1987, 
some minor shortfalls could emerge by 1992/93, but with adequate rainfall 
exportable surpluses of traditional export crops-cotton and rice-would remain 
large. Wheat production would fall only 3 percent short of demand, but sugarcane, 
maize, pulses, and meat would fall more than 50 percent short. The modest wheat 
shortfall is largely the result of low water availability during the Rabi (winter) 
season, but other constraints would contribute. In particular, family labor has 
been identified as a constraint in 6 out of the 9 agro-climatic zones covered by the 
RIBM. Unfortunately, drought in the last several years has severely reduced 
actual output. 
The RIBM projections indicate that with appropriate investments in agriculture 
and water, and moderate increases in yields, large surpluses of cotton and rice 
would continue to be available for export. The value ofrice exports would rise as 
an increasing proportion of these exports would consist of Basmati rice. Again, 
poor weather in 1993 resulted in lower than anticipated levels of production. 
Despite these rather optimistic forecasts the fact remains that the prospects for 
sustaining this level of growth are becoming increasingly limited unless several 
recurring problems are successfully addressed. These include poor crop yields 
and productivity, inadequately funded·and poorly managed support services and 
institutions, serious water resource management issues, long-standing land tenure 
problems, and inappropriate sector pricing policies. 
Problems in the agricultural sector also prompted the country's National 
Commission on Agriculture to recommend, among other things, 15 that 
1. the agricultural sector be modernized with special emphasis on raising 
output of sugar, pulses, and edible oil; 
2. productivity increase be effected through vertical expansion in view of 
limited supplies of fertile land and water for irrigation; 
3. rapid growth of animal husbandry and noncereal food cultivation be 
ensured for augmenting the availability of high food value products; 
4. the existing rural infrastructure be strengthened such that employment 
potential and living conditions in the sector improve; and 
5. an integrated program be evolved tq,arrest environmental degradation to 
conserve and improve the country's natural resources. 
Infrastructure and Agricultural Output 
A major implication of RIBM exercises and the analysis of the National 
Agricultural Commission is that agricultural output is likely to be increasingly 
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constrained. That is, at the extensive margin, increments to land and water for 
cultivation are becoming more expensive. Unfortunately the trend in investment 
in the sector has been downward (table 3). Agriculture accounted for about 25 
percent of total private investment in the late 1970s (table 4). By the late 1980s, 
however, this figure had fallen rather sharply to around 18 percent. In part this 
shift in capital reflects an increasing tendency for the private sector to return to 
longer-term commitments to manufacturing under the Zia regime. 
TABLE3 
PAKISTAN: AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH IN INVESTMENT, 1972-1990 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
Manufacturing Transportation/ 
YEARS Agriculture Large Small Communication Services Tc;ital 
1972/90 6.1 8.7 6.9 3.8 5.0 6.0 
1972/80 6.7 - 3.0 4.0 2.9 5.1 3.1 
1980/90 5.7 19.0 9.3 4.5 5.0 8.3 
1985/90 5.9 18.2 11.8. 8.6 9.5 10.4 
PUBLIC INVESTMENT 
Large-scale 
YEARS Rural Works Indus Basin Energy Manufacturing Railway Total 
1972/90 12.5 -18.5 14.3 10.7 - 2.7 8.4 
1972/80 6.1 -IS.I 9.5 49.3 7.5 14.4 
1980/90 17.9 -21.l 18.3 -12.9 -10.1 3.7 
1985/90 - 2.7 -16.0 18.2 - 8.7 -19.8 5.8 
SOURCE: Compiled from data in World Bank, "Pakistan: Current Economic Situation and Prospects-
Report No. 9283-P AK" (World Bank, Washington, DC, 22 March 1991 ); World Bank, Pakistan: Review 
of the Sixth Five Year Plan (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1983). 
The public sector's investment in agriculture has varied considerably over the 
years (table 5). In the early 1970s rural works and the Indus Basin accounted for 
20 to 30 percent of the public sector's investment. Nationalization of industries 
and a shift in development priorities toward large-scale industries under the 
Bhutto regime caused a dramatic decline in capital formation in Indus Basin 
projects. 
The 1980s have seen a slight increase in public investment in rural works, 
following a decline in the mid- l 970s. These programs along with the Indus Basin 
program have not fared well compared to allocations for energy. 
Indus Basin investment is particularly critical because irrigated land produces 
90 percent of total farm output. The Indus Basin irrigation system, which covers 
two-thirds of the country's cropped area, is the largest contiguous irrigation 
system in the world, including 22 dams and barrages, 57,000 km of canals, and 
about 107,000 watercourses. 
As early as 1983, the decline in Indus Basin investment led the World Bank to 
note: 
While substantial past investments in irrigation infrastructure have given Pakistan the physical 
capacity to harness its surface water supplies to expand irrigated areas, there is substantial scope for 
improving the management of the irrigation system to better meet crop water requirements. The 
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TABLE4 
PAKISTAN: COMPOSITION OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT, 1972-1990 
(Percentage of Total Private Investment) 
MANUFACTURING TRANSPORTATION/ 
YEAR AGRICULTURE Large Small COMMUNICATION SERVICES OTHER 
1972 18.1 20.7 4.3 11.8 8.5 36.5 
1973 19.4 14.9 4.7 17.9 8.8 34.2 
1974 22.8 13.3 5.9 18.0 10.0 30.0 
1975 19.3 13.7 5.9 13.4 9.5 38.1 
1976 24.7 14.6 5.4 11.4 9.2 34.6 
1977 24.6 14.3 5.2 10.4 11.4 34.2 
1978 26.5 12.7 5.0 9.7 10.2 35.9 
1979 25.7 11.9 5.2 10.0 10.4 36.7 
1980 23.7 12.8 4.5 11. 7 10.0 37.3 
1981 21.6 16.1 4.9 8.6 9.4 39.4 
1982 21.0 18.4 5.7 7.6 9.4 38.6 
1983 22.3 20.5 5.0 7.2 8.5 36.5 
1984 23.4 22.5 4.8 7.6 8.0 33.7 
1985 22.8 23.3 4.6 8.8 7.6 32.9 
1986 20.4 25.8 4.9 9.2 7.8 32.0 
1987 20.4 25.8 4.8 9.9 7.8 31.4 
1988 19.5 26.9 5.0 10.0 8.0 30.5 
1989 18.3 31.2 5.0 9.9 7.6 27.9 
1990 18.5 32.7 5.0 8.1 7.3 28.4 
Average Annual Growth of Share 
1972/90 0.1 2.6 0.8 -2.1 --0.8 -1.4 
1972/80 3.4 -5.8 0.6 --0.1 2.1 0.3 
1980/90 -2.4 9.8 1.1 -3.6 -3.1 -2.7 
1985/90 --4.1 7.0 1.7 -1.6 --0.8 -2.9 
SOURCE: Compiled from data in World Bank, "Pakistan: Current Economic Situation and Prospects"; 
World Bank, Pakistan: Review of the Sixth Five Year Plan. 
reliability and efficiency of the overall system is still low. Owing to the deterioration of canals and 
water course commands, more than one half of the gross inflow of the water system is being lost, 
primarily through seepage, percolation and on-farm losses. About 15--40% of the country's canal 
command area is severely waterlogged during various periods of the year, having a depth-to-
watertable of less than 5 feet-a depth at which crop yields begin to decline markedly. 16 
The revised agricultural sector strategy that the government announced at the 
beginning of the 1980s emphasized the need to promote irrigation rehabilitation 
rather than new investments, bring input and output prices closer to world market 
levels, reduce public expenditure, and enhance the role of the private sector. 
These objectives were to be achieved by (1) reorienting public investment 
priorities to focus on rehabilitating irrigation infrastructure, upgrading on-farm 
water management, and enhancing agricultural resources and extension capacity; 
(2) aligning input and output prices with resource costs, with reference to 
international prices, and gradually removing subsidies; and (3) providing incentives 
to the private sector to actively participate in input and output marketing and 
distribution, the processing of grain and the exploitation of fresh groundwater. 
These revised sector objectives were confirmed in the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture's Policy Framework Paper (PFP) issued in 1988. The PFP stressed 
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TABLES 
PAKISTAN: COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT, 1970-1990 
(Percentage of Total Public Investment) 
Large-scale 
Year Rural Works Indus Basin Energy Railway Manufacturing 
1970 3.1 31.0 4.7 6.6 5.4 
1971 I.I 28.0 16.4 6.6 1.9 
1972 1.2 30.0 12.6 3.5 3.0 
1973 2.1 18.3 9.8 2.7 2.8 
1974 1.3 10.8 10.4 1.7 5.5 
1975 1.3 9.5 21.8 5.4 9.6 
1976 1.0 9.1 19.6 3.9 19.4 
1977 0.5 3.1 13.5 4.2 24.1 
1978 0.3 4.2 13.7 3.7 30.3 
1979 0.6 1.9 13.8 3.5 30.4 
1980 0.6 2.7 8.8 3.4 24.9 
1981 2.0 3.4 13.0 4.2 18.5 
1982 2.6 2.8 12.5 4.5 15.0 
1983 3.8 2.8 17.7 3.9 14.6 
1984 3.6 1.5 16.2 2.6 15.0 
1985 3.4 0.6 18.9 3.2 9.1 
1986 3.7 0.6 17.6 3.7 9.6 
1987 3.3 0.6 21.9 3.1 5.7 
1988 3.7 0.4 22.2 2.3 5.1 
1989 2.6 0.2 32.5 0.3 3.7 
1990 2.2 0.2 32.8 0.8 4.3 
Average Annual Growth of Share 
1972190 3.4 -24.3 5.4 - 7.9 2.0 
1972/80 - 8.3 -26.0 - 4.4 - 0.4 30.3 
1980/90 13.9 -22.9 14.1 -13.5 -16.1 
1985/90 - 8.3 -19.7 11.7 -24.2 -13.9 
SOURCE: Compiled from data in World Bank, "Pakistan: Current Economic Situation and Prospects"; 
World Bank, Pakistan: Review of the Sixth Five Year Plan. 
the importance of enhancing productivity through adequate funding of investment 
and appropriate price incentives to farmers. Priority was to be given to accelerating 
privatization of tubewells in fresh groundwater areas, adjusting support prices, 
promoting private sector participation in rice and cotton exports, removing the 
fertilizer subsidy as well as all distribution controls, and ensuring full recovery 
of operations and maintenance costs for irrigation and draining systems. 17 
Good progress has been achieved in carrying out a number of key elements in 
the government's program, especially in terms of reducing input subsidies, 
aligning output prices toward international trend prices, and opening up the sector 
to private sector participation. Much less progress has been made in improving 
the efficiency and management of the irrigation and draining subsector, and in 
enhancing the effectiveness of research and extension. 18 These developments led 
the World Bank in 1991 to note: 
Pakistan continues to confront serious water sector issues, both in terms of extremely slow progress 
in carrying out urgently needed maintenance and rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure, as well as 
in terms of ensuring a fair and efficient distribution of water resources on the basis of actual crop 
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water requirements, rather than historical water rights. To address these issues will require much 
stronger efforts to collect adequate water charges to fully cover operations and maintenance, as well 
as actions to accelerate implementation of on-going investments in the irrigation subsector. There is 
also urgent need to address underlying institutional issues which make it difficult to effectively 
coordinate agricultural support services with planning and management of the irrigation/drainage 
subsector. 19 
Impact of Infrastructure 
The patterns just noted suggest that a situation of deteriorating rural 
infrastructure currently exists in Pakistan. They do not, however, tell us much 
about the relative effectiveness of different types of infrastructure in stimulating 
output in the agricultural sector or private investment directed toward increased 
food production. More important, they provide no insights as to the direction of 
causation-has infrastructural development through lowering costs of production 
stimulated output and/ or investment in the rural sector? or instead, has infrastructure 
been a chronic bottleneck to output? That is, has the government responded with 
increased provision of infrastructure only after infrastructure deficiencies have 
severely constrained output and the flow of private capital into the sector? 
A major issue in the analysis of the role of infrastructure in Pakistan's post-
1971 agricultural development therefore centers around the direction of causation: 
has infrastructure initiated growth in agricultural output or has it simply responded 
to the needs created by that output? 
Among economists there is a broad spectrum of viewpoints, some of them 
diametrically opposed to one another, concerning the role of infrastructure in the 
development process.20 There is consensus, however, as to the need for a certain 
level ofbasic infrastructure facilities in potential agricultural areas, since ultimately 
infrastructure must be a limiting factor without which no development process 
could take place even if other development-inducing factors were present. 
However, opinions as to infrastructure's precise role in the growth process 
beyond this point differ greatly. 
Some economists such as Donald R. Glover and Julian L. Simon21 and Peter C. 
Frederiksen22 take the view that the role of infrastructure is simply to relieve 
"tensions" generated by supply and demand patterns as well as bottleneck 
pressures. Another (smaller) group of economists led by Fritz Voigh23 maintains 
that increases in infrastructure exert a follow-on influence on investment and 
growth. 
The majority of economists seems to take a middle position between these two 
more-or-less diametrically opposed views. 24 Some of them consider infrastructure 
to be a function of the level of development; in other words, the more economically 
and socially backward a potential development area, the stronger the impulses 
emanating from improvements in the stock of infrastructure. Others feel that the 
reciprocal relationship between changes in infrastructure and socioeconomic 
developments is such that the problem of cause and effect is not open to solution. 
Most economists agree, however, that if infrastructure investments, labor 
market planning, and educational planning are uncoordinated, they are likely to 
yield conflicting results or, at any rate, outcomes that could eventually lead to 
undesirable solutions. Much of the confusion as to the role of infrastructure in 
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industrial development occurs because infrastructure itself is not homogeneous. 
In addition, it is quite likely that the contribution to output from infrastructure 
investment will be dependent on the stock of supporting factors-the composition 
and level of which are likely to vary somewhat over time. 
Complicating the issue is the fact that for many years economists were 
reluctant to discuss the issue of causality from a statistical perspective. In recent 
years, however, several statistical tests are gaining wider acceptance in addressing 
issues of this type. The original and most widely used causality test was 
developed by C. W. J. Granger. 25 Applied to the situation at hand, infrastructure 
causes (in the Granger sense) growth in agriculture, if agricultural growth can be 
predicted more accurately by past values of infrastructure investment than by past 
values of its own growth. To be certain that causality runs from infrastructure to 
agricultural growth, past values of infrastructure investment must also be more 
accurate than past values of growth at predicting infrastructure expenditures. 
More formally, four cases are possible: (a) infrastructure causes growth when 
the prediction error for growth decreases when infrastructure investment is 
included in the growth (agriculture) equation; in addition, when growth is added 
to the infrastructure equation, the final prediction error should increase; (b) 
growth causes infrastructure when the prediction error for growth increases when 
infrastructure is added to the regression equation for growth, and is reduced when 
growth is added to the regression equation for infrastructure; (c) feedback occurs 
when the final prediction error decreases when infrastructure is added to the 
growth equation, and the final prediction error decreases when growth is added 
to the infrastructure equation; and (d) no relationship exists when the final 
prediction error increases both when infrastructure is added to the growth 
equation and when growth is added to the infrastructure equation. 
These patterns also imply something about the extent to which inadequate 
stocks of infrastructure may constrain agricultural output and/or inhibit private 
sector investment. Extending the original ideas of A. 0. Hirschman, infrastructure 
development can initiate growth through subsidizing agriculture by lowering the 
costs for certain inputs used in production. 26 This is the process referred to by 
Hirschman as development via excess capacity (of social overhead capital). 
Conversely, lagging infrastructure may increase costs of producing and result in 
slowing output and investment. In this situation the authorities are under pressure 
to expand infrastructure to "catch up" with the stock of directly productive 
capital. This route is often referred to by development economists such as 
Benjamin Higgins as development via shortage (of social overhead capital).27 As 
Higgins notes: 
Either method of unbalanced growth yields an "extra 'dividend" of "induced, easy-to-take or 
compelled decisions resulting in additional investment and output." Balanced growth (of social 
overhead capital and directly productive activity) is not only unattainable in most underdeveloped 
countries, it may not even be desirable. The rate of growth is likely to be faster with chronic 
imbalance, precisely because of the "incentives and pressures" it sets up.28 
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From the preceding it follows that at least four possible situations characterize the 
relationship between infrastructure investment and agricultural output in Pakistan: 
1. Infrastructure Causes Growth. This pattern is likely to reflect a situation 
where infrastructure is in excess (or nonconstraining)-the lower costs 
stemming from its provision result in follow-on investment and 
agricultural output. In this situation, infrastructure could be expected to 
have a high degree of linkage with productive factors and thus produce 
a strong output/investment response. 
2. Growth Causes Infrastructure. Here infrastructure is lagging and responds 
to the needs created by previous agricultural growth. In this situation, 
infrastructure is likely to be a constraint on that output. This may have 
occurred in Pakistan, particularly during periods (such as the 1980s) 
when agricultural output increased rapidly. Although infrastructure 
expanded during this period, it may still (given the needs) have been 
insufficient to produce a substantial stimulus to output. 
3. A Feedback Relationship Exists between Growth and Infrastructure. 
Growth and infrastructure become interdependent, perhaps reflecting a 
situation where infrastructure is likely to be a binding constraint on 
growth. Once increased, infrastructure is adequate (relative to needs) to 
provide a positive stimulus to investment and/or further output. 
4. No Relationship Exists between Growth and Infrastructure. Infrastructure 
is not a constraint on agricultural growth, nor does it possess or create the 
type oflinkages needed to induce increases in output or investment in the 
sector. 
Points 2 and 3 imply that some threshold level of infrastructure may be 
necessary before positive economic results can be obtained from expanding this 
type of capital. 
Operational Procedures 
The Pakistani government does not publish data on the stock of and increments 
to the country's infrastructure. By following the procedure of Mario I. Blejer and 
Mohsin S. Khan, however, it is possible to approximate increments to the nation's 
infrastructural base.29 The basic assumption underlying these proxies is that 
infrastructure investment is an ongoing process that moves slowly over time and 
cannot be changed very rapidly. 
The first of the two approaches takes the trend level of real public sector 
investment as representing the long-term er infrastructural component. In the 
discussion that follows, this measure is referred to as "estimated infrastructure." 
In computing this measure of infrastructure we have used a linear trend. Deviations 
of real public sector investment from the trend are assumed to correspond to 
noninfrastructural investment. 
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A second approach is to make the distinction between types of public investment 
on the basis of whether the investment is expected or not. Again, it is assumed that 
expected, or anticipated, public investment is closer to the long-term or 
infrastructural component. If deterioration is occurring in the country's stock of 
infrastructure, this measure may be a more accurate proxy than that obtained by 
using the trend method. It was the one used in the computations that follow. 
All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator and are in constant 1985 
prices.3° For best statistical results, the variables were transformed into their 
logarithmic values. 31 
A major conceptual problem in a study of this type is that public infrastructure 
is usually not specifically directed toward one particular sector. Energy, for 
example, might be used by a number of sectors, some of which, perhaps, were not 
even considered in the original feasibility studies. Because of this a number of 
different measures of infrastructure (and investment) were used. As purely a basis 
of comparison, several measures of private investment (total private and private 
in agriculture) were also included in the study. 
Relationships between infrastructure expenditures and the economy were 
considered valid if they were statistically significant at the 95 percent level of 
confidence. That is, if95 percent of the time we could conclude that they had not 
occurred by pure chance, we considered them statistically significant. 32 
There is no theoretical reason to believe that infrastructure and the economy 
have a set lag relationship--that is, they impact on one another over a fixed time 
period. The period could be rather short run, involving largely the spin-off from 
construction, or longer term, as either term expands from the stimulus provided 
by the other. To find the optimal adjustment period of impact, lag structures of up 
to six years were estimated. The lag structure with the highest level of statistical 
significance was the one chosen as best depicting the relationship under 
consideration (the optimal lag reported in tables 6 and 7). 
Results 
The tests for causality between infrastructure (and investment) and agricultural 
output produced several interesting patterns (table 6): 
1. The public sector rural works infrastructure has largely been one of 
response to growth in agricultural output. That is, expended rural works 
programs have not stimulated growth in agricultural production. The 
same also appears to be the case with regard to local government 
investment and infrastructure. 
2. Interestingly enough, Indus Basin investment (and infrastructure) were 
not statistically significant in affecti11.g agricultural production. 
3. The strongest linkages between public infrastructure and the agricultural 
sector originated from total government investment. A moderate stimulus 
was obtained from expanded government investments in semipublic 
activities. These included energy (together with Indus Basin and rural 
works). Apparently, therefore, Indus Basin and rural works have the 
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TABLE6 
PAKISTAN: INTERACTION OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT, 
INFRASTRUCTURE, AND AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT, 1972-1990 
CAUSATION PATTERNS 
A B c D DOMINANT PATTERN 
Total public I 2 2 4 Feedback 
investment (0.27E-2) (0.19E-2) (0.82E-2) (0.53E-2) (+m,+w) 
Total public I 4 2 I Feedback 
infrastructure (0.27E-2) (O.I IE-2) (0.67E-2) (0.44E-2) (+s,+w) 
Total private 1 I 3 I lnvestment->Output 
investment (0.27E-2) (0.19E-2) (0.26E-2) (0.29E-2) (+m) 
Rural works I 1 4 4 Output-> Investment 
investment (0.27E-2) (0.28E-2) (0.64E-O) (O.ISE-0) (+w) 
Rural works I I 4 I Output-> Infrastructure 
infrastructure (0.27E-2) (0.28E-2) (0.29E-l) (0.22E-l) (+w) 
Private investment I I 4 4 Feedback 
agriculture (0.27E-2) (0.22E-2) (0.84E-2) (0.44E-2) (+w,+w) 
Semipublic I 2 2 4 Feedback 
investment (0.27E-2) (0.20E-2) (0.17E-l) (0.14E-l) (+m,+w) 
Semipublic I 2 I 4 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.27E-2) (0.22E-2) (O.ISE-1) (0.14E-l) (+w,+w) 
General govt. 1 3 I 2 Output-> Investment 
investment (0.27E-2) (0.28E-2) (O.lOE-1) (0.63E-2) (+w) 
General govt. 1 2 I I Feedback 
infrastructure (0.27E-2) (0.24E-2) (0.77E-2) (0.52E-l) (+w,+m) 
Federal govt. I 3 I 3 Feedback 
investment (0.27E-2) (0.25E-2) (0.19E-l) (0.17E-l) (+w,+w) 
Federal govt. I 2 I 2 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.27E-2) (0.2IE-2) (0.13E-l) (0.88E-2) (+w,+w) 
Provincial govt. I I 2 2 Output-> Investment 
investment (0.27E-2) (0.29E-2) (0.13E-l) (0.80E-2) (+w) 
Provincial govt. I 2 2 3 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.27E-2) (0.25E-2) (0.96E-2) (0.76E-2) (+w,+w) 
Local govt. I I I I Output-> Investment 
investment (0.27E-2)· (0.30E-2) (0.33E-l) (0.21E-l) (+m) 
Local govt. 1 1 1 2 Output-> Infrastructure 
infrastructure (0.27E-2) (0.28E-2) (0.37E-1) (0.27E-l) (+w) 
NOTES: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsaio Procedure was incorporated 
to determine the optimal lag. All variables were deflate4 by the GDP deflator (1985 = JOO) and were 
estimated in their logarithmic form. Regression Patterns: A = private on private; B = public on private; 
C =public on public; D =private on public. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest final prediction 
error, given in parentheses under columns A, B, C, and D. The signs (+,-)represent the direction ofimpact. 
In the case of feedback the two signs represent the lowest final prediction error of relationships B and D. 
Each of the variables was regressed with 1, 2, 3, and4 year lags, and the optimal lag in years is indicated 
by 1, 2, 3, or 4 in columns A, B, C, and D. Strength assessment (s =strong; m =moderate; w =weak) is 
based on the size of the standardized regression coefficient and t test of statistical significance. 
482 Robert E. Looney 
potential to increase agricultural output, but only when they are undertaken 
in conjunction with other types of investment. 
4. In all cases investment had as great or greater a stimulus than infrastructure 
on agricultural production. This finding suggests that demand factors 
may be as important (or more so) than the supply-enhancing linkages 
associated with government programs. 
5. Private investment in agricultural was the only type of investment that 
was characterized as increasing agricultural output without a feedback 
linkage occurring. 
With regard to private investment in the agricultural sector (table 7), we find the 
following: 
l. In general, there were considerably more statistically significant results 
involving infrastructure (investment) and private investment than 
infrastructure and output. Again, in contrast to agricultural output there 
were a number of negative relationships involving public sector programs 
and private investment in agriculture. 
2. With regard to the two specific public programs directed toward the 
agricultural sector, rural works has had a weak (albeit positive) impact 
on private investment in agriculture. In turn, private investment in the 
sector has stimulated further investment (and infrastructure) in rural 
capital formation. On the other hand, Indus Basin investment has had a 
negative effect on private investment in the agricultural sector. In 
addition, private investment has had an even stronger negative effect on 
Indus Basin investment. Indu~ Basin infrastructure has not stimulated 
private investment in agriculture. Again, private investment in agriculture 
has reduced further increments to Indus Basin infrastructure. 
3. Energy investment has provided a modest stimulus to private investment 
in agriculture. Also important in this regard were general public investment 
(and infrastructure) and local government infrastructure. 
4. The strongest inducement to private investment in agriculture was 
provided by provincial government infrastructure. 
5. In addition to the Indus Basin investment, negative relationships between 
government programs and private investment were associated public 
enterprise infrastructure and investment. 
Conclusions 
In their review of the literature, Will Martin and Peter G. Warr note that 
declines in the relative importance of the agricultural sector to economic growth 
in developing countries are usually attributea to three broad groups of potential 
causes: declining relative prices of agricultural products, differential rates of 
technical change, and changes in relative factor endowments. 33 By all measures 
this literature has stressed the effects of relative prices, with technology usually 
assumed to be stagnant. Unfortunately, the factor accumulation effects have 
received minimal attention. 
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TABLE 7 
PAKISTAN: INTERACTION OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT, 
INFRASTRUCTURE, AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE, 1972-1990 
CAUSATION PATTERNS 
A B c D DOMINANT PATTERN 
Total public 4 2 2 2 Feedback 
investment (0.84E-2) (0.76E-2) (0.82E-2) (0.365-2) (+w,+w) 
Total public 4 4 2 3 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.84E-2) (0.6SE-2) (0.67E-2) (0.49E-2) (+w,+w) 
Rural works 4 2 4 3 Feedback 
investment (0.84E-2) (0.73E-2) (0.64E-O) (O.lSE-0) (+w,+m) 
Rural works 4 1 4 3 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.84E-2) (0.62E-2) (0.29E-l} (0.94-2) (+w,+w) 
Public enterprises 4 2 2 2 Feedback 
investment (0.84E-2) (0.61E-2) (0.17E-l) (0.16E-l) (-w,+w) 
Public enterprises 4 2 1 2 Public->Private 
infrastructure (0.84E-2) (0.61E-2) (0.14E-l} (O.ISE-1) (-w) 
Public investment 4 1 4 3 Feedback 
energy (0.84E-2) (0.4SE-2) (0.89E-l) (0.72E-l} (+m,+w) 
Public infrastructure 4 1 4 4 Feedback 
energy (0.84E-2) (0.69E-2) (O.SIE-1) (0.76E-l) (+w,+w) 
Railroad 4 1 1 1 Public->Private 
investment (0.84E-2) (0.73E-2) (0.39E-O) (0.44E-O) (-w) 
Railroad 4 1 4 2 Private--> Public 
infrastructure (0.84-2) (0.97E-2) (O.SSE-1) (0.47E-l) (+w} 
General public 4 3 1 3 Feedback 
investment (0.84E-2) (0.33E-2) ·(O.IOE-1) (0.71E-2) (+m,+m) 
General public 4 4 1 4 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.84E-2) (0.2SE-l) (0.77E-2) (0.71E-2) (+m,+w) 
Federal 4 2 1 1 Feedback 
investment (0.84E-2) (0.70E-2) (0.19E-l} (0.71E-2) (+w,+w) 
Federal 4 1 1 2 Public-> Private 
infrastructure (0.84E-2) (0.70E-2) (0.13E-2) (0.12E-l) (+w) 
Public investment 4 1 1 2 Feedback 
in Indus Basin (0.84E-2) (0.61E-2) (0.23E-O) (0.13E-O) (-w,-m) 
Public infrastructure 4 1 1 4 Private--> Public 
in Indus Basin (0.84E-2) . (0.9SE-2) (0.12E-0) (0.49E-l) (-m) 
Provincial govt. 4 2 2 3 Feedback 
investment (0.84E-2) (0.39E-2) (0.13E-l) (0.83E-2) (+w,+m) 
Provincial govt. 4 1 2 4 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.84E-2) (0.33E-2) (0.96Ii-2) (O.SOE-2) (+s,+w) 
Local government 4 3 1 3 Feedback 
investment (0.84E-2) (0.48E-2) (0.34E-l) (O. lSE-1) (+w,+m) 
Local government 4 2 1 4 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.84E-2) (0.43E-2) (0.37E-l) (0.20E-l) (+m,+m) 
NOTES: See table 6. 
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Martin and Warr found that in the case of Indonesian agriculture the process 
of capital accumulation may be extremely important in determining the economic 
process by which the share of this sector declines with economic growth. Their 
results suggest that further accumulation of capital in relation to labor should 
have significant effects on that sector's share of GDP. 34 
While not directly examining the role of factor prices and technological 
change in agriculture, the results of the causation tests presented earlier are 
consistent with Martin and Warr's analysis. They suggest, however, that the 
source of capital may be critical in determining the manner in which the 
agricultural sector will grow over time. Specifically, the most effective way of 
increasing agricultural output in Pakistan is to encourage more private investment 
in the sector. While some types of government infrastructure stimulate increased 
levels of food production, they tend not to be the ones directed toward that 
sector-that is, rural works, Indus Basin. In fact, there is evidence that the Indus 
Basin competes with the private sector for funds (or at least discourages private 
investment in the sector). On the other hand, deficiencies in several types of 
infrastructure may be a moderate constraint on agricultural production. These 
include total public investment (and infrastructure), energy, and several types of 
general government infrastructure. What is suggested here is that a better 
coordination of government programs in which an effort is made to alleviate 
conflicts between individual projects may be more productive than government 
programs directly oriented toward the sector. 
The results presented here are consistent with the idea that agricultural 
development in Pakistan must now rely on intensive rather than extensive types 
of inputs. That is, rather than allocating funds toward bringing more land under 
cultivation (and irrigation), the government should strive to encourage activities 
that increase output per acre. This would include incentives to the private sector 
to increase mechanization together with other-yield increasing types of inputs. 
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